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Ultimately military personnel deal with life and death Issues--even if for many of these personnel the 
likelihood of the ultimate is very remote. Requiring accountability for these personnel--the taking of 
responsibility for one's actions and their consequences--is a sound abstract principle. However, it too 
easily breaks down in concrete instances. 
 
A military leader might demand punishment for all--including himself or herself--whenever one's action 
or lack of it is followed by noxious consequences. Even recognizing that events occur that are indeed 
beyond the control and comprehension of humans, such a leader would at least possess a consistent 
policy. One exemplification of this is the common, corrupted Spartan aphorism--"Come back with your 
shield or on it." There are no excuses. 
 
Many United States (US) military leaders and their civilian authorities have taken a different tack. They 
have attempted to make judicious distinctions about the causal nature of one's action, inaction, and 
some consequence. They have also attempted to make similar distinctions about the value and intensity 
of the consequence. This is both admirable and consistent common US values. Whether it is the best 
way to control a military organization is more controversial. 
 
Today the huge problem for US Air Force accountability is that some military leaders and some civilian 
authorities take neither of the two above approaches--although they publicly claim and may privately 
believe that they do. Instead they do one of three things. (1) They play politics and seek anything from 
mass media visibility, a higher probability of being elected or promoted, greater financial assets, or more 
support for their own ideology. (2) They seek some self-psychological effect--catharsis, transcendence, 
sacrificing to one's supergo, closure--as resolution of a noxious consequence. (3) They act on the sincere 
belief that some people--both spies and counterspies, terrorists and anti/counterterrorists, perpetrators 
and perpetratees, the malign and the benign--always are responsible for events. A quote which may 
exemplify this approach was cited recently by The New York Times from US Senator Richard Shelby 
(Republican-Alabama), Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concerning the Khobar complex 
bombing--"Someone should be held accountable, shouldn't they?" 
 
So, should someone be held accountable for the bombing or--for that matter-- other noxious events in 
the world. The easy answer is sure--the spies, the terrorists, the malign who planned, supported, and 
perpetrated the act. The more difficult but correct answer is that the counterspies, the 
anti/counterterrorists, and the benign are not always by the widest stretch of the imagination 
responsible for all events and, therefore, should sometimes not be held accountable. The inquisitors 
who venally play politics, narcissistically seek self-psychological effect, and sincerely advocate for the 
prepotency of an omnipresent concept are actually subverting accountability's essence and its positive 
consequences for military organizations. And in General Fogleman's case, they are accountable for the 
loss of a decent man who has been a judicious practitioner of accountability. (See Double, R. (1996.) 
Four naturalist accounts of moral responsibility. Behavior and Philosophy. 24, 137-143; Schmid, J., & 
Fiedler, K. (1996.) Language and implicit attributions in the Nuremberg Trials: Analyzing prosecutors' and 
defense attorneys' closing speeches. Human Communication Research, 23, 371-398; Schmitt, E. (July 29, 
1
et al.: Trends. Can Accountability Be Accountable? General Fogleman Requests Retirement
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1997
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
2 
 
1997.) Air Force chief quits, displeased with handling of Saudi bombing Issue. The New York Times. 
(http://www.nytimes.com))(Keywords: Accountability, Military Personnel, Military) 
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